Adaptive Approaches for Fully Distributed Nash Equilibrium Seeking in
  Networked Games by Ye, Maojiao & Hu, Guoqiang
ar
X
iv
:1
91
2.
00
41
5v
1 
 [m
ath
.O
C]
  1
 D
ec
 20
19
Adaptive Approaches for Fully Distributed Nash Equilibrium Seeking
in Networked Games
Maojiao Ye and Guoqiang Hu
Abstract— This paper considers the design of fully distributed
Nash equilibrium seeking strategies for multi-agent games. To
develop fully distributed seeking strategies, two adaptive control
laws, including a node-based control law and an edge-based
control law, are proposed. In the node-based adaptive strategy,
each player adjusts their own weight on their procurable
consensus error dynamically. Moreover, in the edge-based
algorithm, the fully distributed strategy is designed by adjusting
the weights on the edges of the communication graph adap-
tively. By utilizing LaSalle’s invariance principle, it is shown
that the Nash equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable
by both strategies given that the players’ objective functions
are twice-continuously differentiable, the partial derivatives
of the players’ objective functions with respect to their own
actions are globally Lipschitz, the pseudo-gradient vector of the
game is strongly monotone and the communication network is
undirected and connected. In addition, we further show that the
edge-based method can be easily adapted to accommodate time-
varying communication conditions, in which the communication
network is switching among a set of undirected and connected
graphs. In the last, a numerical example is given to illustrate
the effectiveness of the proposed methods.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking for multi-agent
games becomes a thriving research topic in recent years
(see e.g., [1]-[10] for more comprehensive literature review).
In particular, continuous-time consensus-based algorithms
are shown to be very powerful and effective methods that
can solve networked games with incomplete information.
For example, networked aggregative games can be ad-
dressed by combing dynamic average consensus protocols
with the gradient methods [1][2][3]. Adaptations to general
multi-agent games can be achieved by utilizing gradient
search algorithms and leader-following consensus protocols
[4][5][6][10]. Likewise, N -cluster games were solved in [7]-
[8] by taking the advantages of average consensus and the
gradient search. Roughly speaking, the main idea behind
the design of the consensus-based Nash equilibrium seeking
algorithms in many existing works can be summarized as
follows.
1) Employ consensus protocols, either leader-following
consensus protocols or dynamic average consensus
protocols, to estimate information required for the
optimization of the players’ objective functions.
2) Based on the estimated information, each player up-
dates its own action by utilizing the gradient search
based optimization techniques.
Most importantly, to ensure the convergence of the closed-
loop system, one should include a control gain (singular
perturbation parameter) to ensure that the consensus part
would be faster than the optimization part. In this way,
the consensus-based algorithms are actually in two-time
scales and they have advantages due to their simplicity
and effectiveness. However, one drawback for this class of
methods is that the explicit quantification of the control gain
(singular perturbation parameter) depends on the Lipschitz
constants of the players’ objective functions, the topologies
of the communication graphs and the number of players in
the game. It should be noted that in many practical situations,
these centralized information can hardly be obtained by
all the players for games under distributed communication
networks. Moreover, as the choices of the control gain
(singular perturbation parameter) depend on the Lipschitz
constants as well as the network topology, these methods
loss plug-in plug-out property. More specifically, if there
exist players that join the game or leave the game, the
singular perturbation parameter should be re-tuned to ensure
the stability of the new Nash equilibrium.
Actually, in [6], the authors tried to adopt a decaying
control gain which is not integrable but square integrable
to remove the centralized control gain. Unfortunately, the
decaying control gain is shared among all the players’ control
strategies, indicating that the players need to coordinate on
it. In fact, the authors in [9] showed that in the discrete-
time scenario, exact convergence to the Nash equilibrium
can be obtained by utilizing the method proposed therein if
coordinated stepsize is adopted while only convergence to a
neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium can be concluded if
the stepsize is uncoordinated. Similarly, the method in [3] not
only requires the determination of the singular perturbation
parameter but also some other shared control gains. In [2],
the authors adopted several coordinated control gains among
all the players’ seeking strategies, whose quantifications also
require centralized information such as the number of players
and the maximum value of the players’ objective functions.
In short, most of the existing literature on continuous-
time consensus-based Nash equilibrium seeking strategies
require the determinations of some coordinated control
gains, which possibly depend on centralized information,
to ensure the convergence of the closed-loop system. In
this regard, these methods are not fully distributed. Motivated
by the above observations, this paper intends to design fully
distributed Nash equilibrium seeking strategies in which the
control gains are distributed and are independent of any
centralized information.
To establish fully distributed Nash equilibrium seeking
strategies, the main idea of this paper is to adjust the
control gain (singular perturbation parameter) adaptively. In
comparison with the existing works, the main contributions
of the paper are summarized as follows.
1) A node-based adaptive strategy and an edge-based
adaptive strategy are proposed to achieve the fully
distributed seeking of Nash equilibrium in multi-agent
games. The node-based adaptive strategy achieves the
goal by adaptively updating each player’s weight on
its overall procurable consensus error. Moreover, the
edge-based adaptive strategy achieves fully distributed
Nash equilibrium seeking through adaptively adjusting
the weights on the edges of the communication graphs.
2) Based on the LaSalle’s invariance principle, it is the-
oretically shown that the Nash equilibrium is glob-
ally asymptotically stable under both adaptive seeking
strategies given that the players’ objective functions are
twice-continuously differentiable, the partial deriva-
tives of the players’ objective functions with respect to
their own actions are globally Lipschitz, the pseudo-
gradient vector of the game is strongly monotone
and the communication network is undirected and
connected.
3) Extensions to time-varying communication topologies
where the communication network switches among a
set of undirected and connected graphs is discussed for
the edge-based Nash equilibrium seeking algorithm. It
is shown that the edge-based algorithm can be easily
adapted to accommodate time-varying communication
graphs.
We proceed the remainder of the paper as follows. In
Section II, the motivation of the paper is explained and
the problem considered in this paper is given. Section III
presents the main results of the paper in which a node-
based seeking strategy and an edge based seeking strategy are
given. Extensions to time-varying communication networks
are discussed in Section IV. Numerical simulations are
provided in Section V and conclusions are drawn in Section
VI.
II. MOTIVATION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider a game with N players who are equipped with
a communication graph. Denote the player set as V =
{1, 2, · · · , N}. Correspondingly, the players are labeled from
1 to N , respectively. In the considered game, each player
tries to
minxi fi(x), (1)
where fi(x) and xi ∈ R are the objective function and
action of player i, respectively and x = [x1, x2, · · · , xN ]T .
Suppose that each player’s own action and objective function
are available for itself but not for the other players’ actions.
Then, the players can seek the Nash equilibrium according
to [4]
x˙i = −∇ifi(yi),
y˙ij = −θij
(
N∑
k=1
aik(yij − ykj) + aij(yij − xj)
)
,
(2)
where θij = θθ¯ij , θ is the singular perturbation parameter
that would affect the convergence of the method in (2), θ¯ij
is a fixed positive constant, ∇ifi(yi) = ∂fi(x)∂xi |x=yi and
yi = [yi1, yi2, · · · , yiN ]T . In addition, aij is (i, j)th entry
of the adjacency matrix of communication graph, which will
be defined later.
In [4], we have shown that there exists a positive constant
θ∗ such that for each θ ∈ (θ∗,∞), the Nash equilibrium is
globally exponentially stable by utilizing (2) under certain
conditions. However, the quantification of θ∗ depends on the
Lipschitz constants of the players’ objective functions, the
topology of the communication network and the number of
players in the game. Hence, it is challenging for each player
to distributively calculate θ∗. Moreover, if there exist players
that join or leave the game, θ∗ might need to be re-tuned to
ensure the stability of the resulting new Nash equilibrium.
Motivated by the incentive to relax these restrictions, this
paper intends to design adaptive control laws to achieve
fully distributed seeking of the Nash equilibrium, whose
definition is given as follows.
Definition 1: An action profile x∗ = (x∗i ,x
∗
−i) is a Nash
equilibrium if for all xi ∈ R, i ∈ V ,
fi(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i) ≤ fi(xi,x∗−i), (3)
where x−i = [x1, x2, · · · , xi−1, xi+1, · · · , xN ]T .
The main results of the paper are established based on the
following conditions.
Assumption 1: The players’ objective functions fi(x) for
i ∈ V are twice-continuously differentiable.
Assumption 2: For each i ∈ V , ∇ifi(x) is globally
Lipschitz, i.e., there exists a positive constant li such that
||∇ifi(x)−∇ifi(z)|| ≤ li||x− z||, (4)
for all x, z ∈ RN .
Assumption 3: There exists a positive constant m such
that
(x− z)T (P(x)− P(z)) ≥ m||x− z||2, (5)
for all x, z ∈ RN , where P(x) =
[∇1f1(x),∇2f2(x), · · · ,∇NfN (x)]T .
Remark 1: Note that Assumptions 1-3 are standard as-
sumptions in the existing literature (see, e.g., [4][5]). As-
sumption 1 ensures the existence of continuously differen-
tiable gradient vectors, which further indicates the existence
of solutions under the proposed methods. Assumption 2
can be removed with the presented results sacrificed to
be semi-global versions. In addition, Assumption 3 ensures
the existence of the unique Nash equilibrium on which
P(x∗) = 0N , where 0N denotes an N -dimensional zero
column vector. Note that P(x) = 0N if and only if x = x∗
by Assumption 3 [10].
III. MAIN RESULTS
To achieve fully distributed Nash equilibrium seeking, we
suppose that the players are equipped with a communication
graph represented by G = {V , E}, where V and E ⊂ V × V
are the vertex set and edge set, respectively. The adjacency
matrix associated with G is defined as A = [aij ] where aij =
1 if (j, i) ∈ E and aij = 0 if (j, i) /∈ E . The network is said to
be undirected if aij = aji for all i, j ∈ V . Correspondingly,
the Laplacian matrix of G is L = D − A, where D is a
diagonal matrix whose elements are
∑N
j=1 aij for i ∈ V ,
successively. Moreover, the network is connected if there is
a path between any two vertices. In addition, we consider that
the communication network does not contain any self-loop,
i.e., aii = 0, for all i ∈ V . With the defined communication
graph, the following assumption will be utilized to establish
the results in this section.
Assumption 4: The undirected communication graph G is
connected.
Based on the connectivity of the communication network,
two fully distributed Nash equilibrium seeking algorithms
will be proposed successively in this section. More specif-
ically, a node-based adaptive design and an edge-based
adaptive design will be presented, successively.
A. Fully distributed strategy through node-based design
In this section, we propose a node-based adaptive strategy
to achieve the fully distributed Nash equilibrium seeking.
Motivated by [4] and [11], each player i, where i ∈ V ,
can update its action according to
x˙i =−∇ifi(yi),
y˙ij =− θij
(
N∑
k=1
aik(yij − ykj) + aij(yij − xj)
)
,
θ˙ij =γij
(
N∑
k=1
aik(yij − ykj) + aij(yij − xj)
)T
×
(
N∑
k=1
aik(yij − ykj) + aij(yij − xj)
)
,
(6)
where γij is a positive constant.
Remark 2: Similar to the method in [4], yij in (6) stands
for player i’s local estimation on xj . Hence, yi is generated
by player i to estimate x, which is needed in the optimization
of the players’ objective functions. However, different from
[4], the control gain θij is designed to be adaptive. As the
time derivative of θij is non-negative, it is clear that θij
would be non-decreasing.
To establish the convergence results, define the consensus
error as eij = yij − xj , then,
x˙i =−∇ifi(ei + x),
e˙ij =− θij
(
N∑
k=1
aik(eij − ekj) + aijeij
)
− x˙j ,
θ˙ij =γij
(
N∑
k=1
aik(eij − ekj) + aijeij
)T
×
(
N∑
k=1
aik(eij − ekj) + aijeij
)
,
(7)
where ei = [ei1, ei2, · · · , eiN ]T .
Let
A0 =diag{aij},
θ =diag{θij},
M =L ⊗ IN×N +A0,
e =[eT1 , e
T
2 , · · · , eTN ]T ,
y =[yT1 ,y
T
2 , · · · ,yTN ]T ,
(8)
where diag{pij} for i, j ∈ V defines a diagonal matrix whose
elements are p11, p12, · · · , p1N , p2N , · · · , pNN , successively.
Moreover, ⊗ is the Kronecker product and IN×N is an N ×
N -dimensional identity matrix. Then, the following theorem
can be obtained.
Theorem 1: Suppose that Assumptions 1-4 hold. Then,
1) The Nash equilibrium x∗ is globally asymptotically
stable;
2) The estimation error ||y − 1N ⊗ x|| → 0, as t→∞;
3) For each i, j ∈ V , θij converges to some finite value.
Proof: Define the Lyapunov candidate function as
V = V1 + V2 + V3, (9)
where
V1 = e
TMe, (10)
V2 =
1
2
(x− x∗)T (x− x∗), (11)
and
V3 =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
(θij − θ∗ij)2
γij
. (12)
Then,
V˙1 =e˙
TMe+ eTM e˙
=− 2eTMθMe− 2eTM(1N ⊗ x˙),
(13)
and
V˙2 =− (x− x∗)T [∇ifi(yi)]vec
=− (x− x∗)T [∇ifi(x)]vec
− (x− x∗)T (− [∇ifi(x)]vec + [∇ifi(yi)]vec)
≤−m||x− x∗||2 +max
i∈V
{li}||x− x∗||||e||,
(14)
where the notation [pi]vec for i ∈ V defines a column vector
with its ith entry being pi andmaxi∈V{li} is the largest value
of li for i ∈ V . In addition, the last inequality is obtained
based on Assumptions 2-3.
Moreover,
V˙3 =2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
(θij − θ∗ij)(
N∑
k=1
aik(eij − ekj) + aijeij)T
× (
N∑
k=1
aik(eij − ekj) + aijeij)
=2eTM(θ − θ∗)Me,
(15)
where θ∗ = diag{θ∗ij}.
Therefore,
V˙ =V˙1 + V˙2 + V˙3
≤− 2eTMθ∗Me−m||x− x∗||2
+max
i∈V
{li}||x− x||||e|| − 2eTM1N ⊗ x˙
≤− 2eTMθ∗Me−m||x− x∗||2
+max
i∈V
{li}||x− x∗||||e||
+ l¯1||e||2 + l¯2||e||||x− x∗||,
(16)
where l¯1 = 2||M ||
√
N maxi∈V{li} and l¯2 =
2||M ||N maxi∈V{li}. Note that the last inequality is
obtained by noticing that
||2eTM1N ⊗ x˙||
=||2eTM1N ⊗ [∇ifi(yi)]vec||
=||2eTM1N ⊗ [∇ifi(yi)−∇ifi(x)]vec||
+ ||2eTM1N ⊗ [∇ifi(x) −∇ifi(x∗)]vec||
≤l¯1||e||2 + l¯2||e||||x− x∗||.
(17)
Define
A =
[
m − l¯2+maxi∈V{li}2
− l¯2+maxi∈V{li}2 2λmin(θ∗)λmin(MM)− l¯1
]
,
(18)
and let
λmin(θ
∗) >
(l¯2 +maxi∈V{li})2 + 4ml¯1
8mλmin(MM)
. (19)
Then,
V˙ ≤ −λmin(A)||E||2, (20)
where λmin(A) > 0 and E = [(x − x∗)T , eT ]T .
Noticing that V˙ ≤ 0 for all t ≥ 0, we get that θij for
all i, j ∈ V are bounded. In addition, by utilizing LaSalle’s
invariance principle [14], ||E|| → 0, as t → ∞. From (6),
we see that θij is non-decreasing as it’s time derivative is
nonnegative for all t ≥ 0. Moreover, as t → ∞, ||e|| → 0
and ||x− x∗|| → 0, we see that θ˙ij → 0 as t→∞. Hence,
θij for i, j ∈ V will converge to some finite values as t→∞.
B. Fully distributed strategy through edge-based design
In this section, an edge-based adaptive control strategy
will be proposed by dynamically adjusting the weights on
the edges of the communication graphs.
Motivated by [4] and [12], design the Nash equilibrium
seeking strategy as
x˙i =−∇ifi(yi),
y˙ij =−
(
N∑
k=1
aikcik(yij − ykj) + aij c¯ij(yij − xj)
)
,
c˙ij =aij(yi − yj)T (yi − yj),
˙¯cij =cij(yij − xj)T (yij − xj),
(21)
where i, j ∈ V and cij(0) = cji(0) for all i, j ∈ V .
Remark 3: Different from (6), where the control gain on
each player’s accessible consensus error is designed to be
adaptive, the weights on the edges of the communication
graph are dynamically adjusted in (21). From (21), it can be
seen that both c˙ij and ˙¯cij are non-negative, indicating that
cij and c¯ij are both non-decreasing.
Define eij = yij − xj . Then, the method in (21) can be
rewritten as
x˙i =−∇ifi(ei + x),
e˙ij =−
(
N∑
k=1
aikcik(eij − ekj) + aij c¯ijeij
)
− x˙j ,
c˙ij =aij(ei − ej)T (ei − ej),
˙¯cij =aije
T
ijeij .
(22)
Theorem 2: Suppose that Assumptions 1-4 are satisfied.
Then,
1) The Nash equilibrium x∗ is globally asymptotically
stable;
2) The estimation error ||y − 1N ⊗ x|| → 0 as t→∞;
3) The adaptive control gains cij and c¯ij for all i, j ∈ V
converge to some finite values.
Proof: Define the Lyapunov candidate function as
V = V1 + V2 + V3 + V4, (23)
where
V1 =
1
2
(x − x∗)T (x− x∗),
V2 =
1
2
N∑
i=1
eTi ei,
V3 =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
(cij − c∗)2
4
,
(24)
and
V4 =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
(c¯ij − c∗)2
2
, (25)
and c∗ is a positive constant to be determined later. Then,
V˙1 =− (x− x∗)T [∇ifi(ei + x)]vec
≤−m||x− x∗||2 +max
i∈V
{li}||x− x∗||||e||, (26)
and
V˙2 = −
N∑
i=1
eTi
(
N∑
k=1
aikcik(ei − ek) + d¯iei + x˙
)
, (27)
where d¯i is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are
ai1c¯i1, ai2c¯i2, · · · aiN c¯iN , successively.
Moreover,
V˙3 =
1
2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
(cij − c∗)c˙ij
=
1
2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
(cij − c∗)aij(ei − ej)T (ei − ej)
=
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
(cij − c∗)aijeTi (ei − ej),
(28)
where the last inequality is obtained by utilizing the fact that
cij(t) = cji(t) for all t ≥ 0. In addition,
V˙4 =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
(c¯ij − c∗)aijeTijeij . (29)
Hence,
V˙ ≤−m||x− x∗||2 +max
i∈V
{li}||x− x∗||||e||
−
N∑
i=1
eTi
(
N∑
k=1
aikcik(ei − ek) + d¯iei + x˙
)
+
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
(cij − c∗)aijeTi (ei − ej)
+
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
(c¯ij − c∗)aijeTijeij
≤−m||x− x∗||2 +max
i∈V
{li}||x− x∗||||e||
− c∗eTMe+
N∑
i=1
eTi x˙,
(30)
where∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
eTi x˙
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
eTi [∇ifi(yi)−∇ifi(x)]vec
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
eTi [∇ifi(x)−∇ifi(x∗)]vec
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
≤max
i∈V
{li}||e||2 +max
i∈V
{li}
√
N ||e||||x− x∗||.
(31)
Define
A =
[
m −maxi∈V{li}(1+
√
N)
2
−maxi∈V{li}(1+
√
N)
2 c
∗λmin(M)−maxi∈V{li}
]
,
(32)
and choose
c∗ >
(maxi∈V{li}(1 +
√
N))2
4mλmin(M)
+
maxi∈V{li}
λmin(M)
, (33)
then, λmin(A) > 0 and
V˙ ≤ −λmin(A)||E||2, (34)
E = [(x−x∗)T , (y−1N⊗x)T ]T . Hence, V˙ ≤ 0, indicating
that E, cij and c¯ij stay bounded for all i, j ∈ V . Moreover,
by LaSalle’s invariance principle [14], ||x − x∗|| → 0 and
||y−1N ⊗x|| → 0 as t→∞. In addition, as ||x−x∗|| → 0
and ||y − 1N ⊗ x|| → 0, c˙ij → 0 and ˙¯cij → 0 as t → ∞.
Therefore, cij and c¯ij for all i, j ∈ V would converge to
some finite values.
Remark 4: From Theorems 1-2, we see that both the
proposed node-based adaptive Nash equilibrium seeking al-
gorithm and edge-based adaptive Nash equilibrium seeking
algorithm can achieve fully distributed Nash equilibrium
seeking. Moreover, compared with the method in [4], it is
clear that the requirement on the quantification of the singular
perturbation parameter is removed in the proposed methods.
IV. EXTENSIONS TO SWITCHING COMMUNICATION
CONDITIONS
In this section, we suppose that the communication graph
is switching among a set of undirected and connected
communication graphs. Let p be the number of possible
undirected graphs in the communication condition and define
σ(t) : [0,∞) → 1, 2, · · · , p as a switching signal that maps
the time sequence to the set of possible graphs. Suppose that
the communication graph is fixed for t ∈ [tk, tk+1) where
k = 0, 1, 2, · · · and there exists a positive constant ǫ such
that tk+1 − tk ≥ ǫ for all k = 0, 1, 2, · · · . For notational
convenience, denote the communication graph at time t
as Gσ(t). Correspondingly, the adjacency matrix, Laplacian
matrix and the (i, j)th entry of the adjacency matrix are
denoted as Aσ(t), Lσ(t) and aσ(t)ij , respectively.
Assumption 5: For each i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , p}, the communi-
cation graph Gi is undirected and connected.
Accordingly, the edge-based seeking strategy is adapted
as
x˙i =−∇ifi(yi),
y˙ij =−
(
N∑
k=1
a
σ(t)
ik cik(yij − ykj) + aσ(t)ij c¯ij(yij − xj)
)
,
c˙ij =a
σ(t)
ij (yi − yj)T (yi − yj),
˙¯cij =a
σ(t)
ij (yij − xj)T (yij − xj),
(35)
for i, j ∈ V .
Then, the following result can be obtained.
Theorem 3: Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 and 5 are
satisfied. Then,
1) The Nash equilibrium x∗ is globally asymptotically
stable.
2) The players’ estimation error ||y − 1N ⊗ x|| → 0 as
t→∞.
3) The adaptive control gains cij and c¯ij for all i, j ∈ V
would converge to some finite values.
Proof: Define the Lyapunov candidate function as
V =
1
2
(x − x∗)T (x− x∗) + 1
2
N∑
i=1
eTi ei
+
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
(cij − c∗)2
4
+
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
(c¯ij − c∗)2
2
,
(36)
where c∗ is a positive constant to be determined later. Then,
following the analysis in the proof of Theorem 2, it can be
obtained that
V˙ ≤−m||x− x∗||2 +max
i∈V
{li}||x− x∗||||e||
− c∗eT (Lσ(t) ⊗ IN×N +Aσ(t)0 )e
+max
i∈V
{li}||e||2 +
√
N max
i∈V
{li}||e||||x− x∗||,
(37)
where Aσ(t)0 = diag{aσ(t)ij }. Define λ as the minimum eigen-
value of Lσ(t)⊗IN×N +Aσ(t)0 for all possible combinations
of Lσ(t) and Aσ(t)0 . Then,
V˙ ≤−m||x− x∗||2 +max
i∈V
{li}||x− x∗||||e||
− c∗λ||e||2 +max
i∈V
{li}||e||2
+
√
N max
i∈V
{li}||e||||x− x∗||.
(38)
Then, by choosing c∗ > (max{li}(1+
√
N))2
4mλ +
max{li}
λ
, it can
be obtained that
V˙ ≤ −λmin(A)||E||2, (39)
where λmin(A) > 0 and A =[
m −max{li}(1+
√
N)
2
−max{li}(1+
√
N)
2 c
∗λ−maxi∈V{li}
]
. Hence, by
further utilizing the LaSalle-Yoshizawa theorem [13], the
conclusions can be obtained. 
Remark 5: In [5], a Nash equilibrium seeking was estab-
lished for networked games under time-varying communi-
cation networks. However, it was shown that the singular
perturbation parameter should be neither to large nor too
small to ensure the convergence of the presented method.
However, it is challenging to explicitly calculate the lower-
bound and the upper-bound of the singular perturbation
parameter. Different from the method in [5], the adaptive
method in this section is fully distributed. Hence, it is more
suitable for practical implementation in distributed systems.
V. A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
In this section, we consider the connectivity control game
for a network of 5 mobile sensor networks considered in
[10]. In the considered game, xi ∈ R2. For notational
convenience, denote xi as xi = [xi1, xi2]
T . Moreover, the
players’ objective functions are defined as
f1(x) =x
T
1 x1 + x11 + x12 + 1 + ||x1 − x2||2,
f2(x) =2x
T
2 x2 + 2x21 + 2x22 + 2 + ||x2 − x3||2,
f3(x) =3x
T
3 x3 + 3x31 + 3x32 + 3 + ||x3 − x2||2,
f4(x) =4x
T
4 x4 + 4x41 + 4x42 + 4 + ||x4 − x2||2
+ ||x4 − x5||2,
f5(x) =5x
T
4 x4 + 5x51 + 5x52 + 5 + ||x5 − x1||2,
(40)
by which the Nash equilibrium is unique and is x∗ij = 0.5,
for all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 5}, j ∈ {1, 2} [10].
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2 4 5
3 1
2 4 5
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Fig. 1: The communication graphs.
In the rest, we provide simulation results for the methods
in (6), (21) and (35), successively. Note that as xi ∈ R2,
yij ∈ R2 as well. For notational clarity, we write it as yij =
[yij1, yij2]
T in the remainder of the paper.
A. The node-based adaptive Nash equilibrium seeking strat-
egy under a fixed communication graph
In this section, we consider that the players’ actions are
updated according to (6) under the communication graph in
Fig. 1 (a).
In the simulation, x,y, and θij , i, j ∈ V are initialized
randomly between −20 to 20. In addition, γij = 1 for all
i, j ∈ V . The simulation results generated by the proposed
method in (6) are given in Figs. 2-4. The horizontal and
vertical coordinates of Fig. 2 are xi1 and xi2, respectively.
From Fig. 2, we see that though the variables are randomly
initialized, the proposed method enables the sensors’ position
trajectories to converge to the Nash equilibrium. In addition,
Fig. 3 illustrates θij for i, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 5}, from which
it is clear that θij for all i, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 5} converge to
some finite values. The plots of yij1 versus yij2 for j ∈
{1, 2, · · · , 5} are given in the 5 sub-figures of Fig. 4 for
players 1-5, respectively. From Fig. 4, we see that yi for
all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 5} also converge to the Nash equilibrium,
thus verifying Theorem 1.
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Fig. 2: The plots of the players’ state trajectories, i.e., the
plots of xi1 versus xi2 for i = {1, 2, · · · , 5} generated by
(6).
B. The edge-based adaptive Nash equilibrium seeking strat-
egy under a fixed communication graph
In this section, we simulate the edge-based adaptive Nash
equilibrium seeking algorithm given in (21). Correspond-
ingly, the communication graph is given in Fig. 1 (a).
In the simulation, x, y are initialized randomly between
−20 and 20. Moreover, cij , c¯ij for i, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 5} are
initialized at 1. Fig. 5 plots the sensors’ position trajectories.
The horizontal and vertical coordinates of Fig. 5 represents
the values of xi1 and xi2 for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 5}, respectively.
From Fig. 5, it can be seen that the sensors’ position
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Fig. 3: The trajectories of θij for i, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 5}
generated by (6).
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Fig. 4: The plots of yij1 versus yij2 for i, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 5}
generated by (6), respectively.
trajectories converge to the actual Nash equilibrium of the
game.
Moreover, Fig. 6 plots cij and c¯ij from which it can be
seen that they converge to some finite values. The 5 sub-
figures in Fig. 7 plot yij1 versus yij2, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 5} for
players 1-5, respectively. From Fig. 7, we see that yi for all
i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 5} converge to the Nash equilibrium x∗ as
well. Hence, Theorem 2 is numerically verified.
C. Fully distributed Nash equilibrium seeking under switch-
ing communication topologies
In this section, we simulate the adaptive Nash equilibrium
seeking algorithm given in (35) under switching communica-
tion conditions. Similar to the previous subsections, x, y are
initialized randomly between −20 and 20. Moreover, cij , c¯ij
for i, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 5} are initialized at 1. In addition, we
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Fig. 5: The plots of the players’ state trajectories, i.e., the
plots of xi1 versus xi2 for i = {1, 2, · · · , 5}, generated by
(21).
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Fig. 6: The trajectories of cij and c¯ij for i, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 5}
generated by (21).
suppose that for t < 0.5 and 5 < t < 8, the players
communicate via the graph in Fig. 1 (a). For other time
sequences, the players communicate via the graph in Fig.
1 (b). The simulation results are given in Figs. 8-10. Fig. 8
plots the sensors’ trajectories. The horizontal and vertical
coordinates of Fig. 8 are the values of xi1 and xi2 for
i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 5}, respectively. From Fig. 8, it can be seen
that the sensors’ position trajectories converge to the actual
Nash equilibrium of the game. Fig. 9 shows cij and c¯ij from
which it can be seen that they converge to some finite values.
Moreover, the 5 sub-figures in Fig. 10 plot yij1 versus yij2,
j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 5} for players 1-5, respectively. From Fig. 10,
we see that yi for all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 5} converge to the Nash
equilibrium x∗. Hence, Theorem 3 is numerically verified.
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Fig. 7: The plots of yij1 versus yij2 for i, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 5},
generated by (21), respectively.
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Fig. 8: The plots of the players’ state trajectories, i.e., the
plots of xi1 versus xi2 for i = {1, 2, · · · , 5}, generated by
(35).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper develops fully distributed Nash equilibrium
seeking algorithms for networked game. A node-based adap-
tive algorithm and an edge-based adaptive algorithm are
proposed. The node-based adaptive algorithm achieves the
distributed strategy design via adjusting the weight on each
player’s accessible consensus error adaptively. The edge-
based adaptive algorithm dynamically adjusts the weights
on the edges of the communication graph to achieve fully
distributed Nash equilibrium seeking. Both algorithms are
theoretically validated via Lyapunov stability analysis. In ad-
dition, to highlight the extensibility of the proposed method
under time-varying communication networks, the edge-based
algorithm is adapted to accommodate switching commu-
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Fig. 9: The trajectories of cij and c¯ij for i, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 5}
generated by (35).
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Fig. 10: The plots of yij1 versus yij2 for i, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 5},
generated by (35), respectively.
nication conditions in which the communication network
switches among a set of undirected and connected commu-
nication graphs.
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